

PROVEX: Detecting Botnets with Encrypted C&C Channels

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Introduction & Acknowledgements

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▶ Funded by



Botnet Detection Challenges

Challenge 1: Custom C&C Traffic Encryption



(1998)

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
SURICATA

(2010)



```
cmd[0] = random();  
for(i = 1; i < len; i++) {  
    cmd[i] ^= cmd[i - 1];  
}
```

Challenge 2: High-Speed Networks




Challenge 3: Custom Binary C&C Protocols

offset	0	1	2	3	...	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55
packet A	6a	07	ad	05	...	16	00	50	05	68	a9	d7	3a				
packet B	15	a9	2f	05	...	66	00	50	05	9b	c0	9c	a6	16	07		
packet C	01	26	08	05	...	62	00	50	05	0c	45	c3	8e	47	35	ef	
packet D	08	fe	08	05	...	38	00	50	05	48	0d	3c	d1	11			
packet E	05	fe	08	05	...	2e	00	50	05	3e	5c						
packet F	05	ab	08	05	...	bc	00	50	05	c2	b7	65	ef	b9	22	9f	
packet G	47	80	20	05	...	0a	00	50	05	ad	98	07	60	51	78	83	
packet H	fa	91	50	05	...	28	00	50	05	fc	81	78	76	4e	62		
packet I	a9	35	23	05	...	5f	00	50	05	c9	62	81	70	ad	1c	cc	
packet J	07	f4	a9	05	...	01	0f	00	50	05	70	29	92	90	08		

ProVeX

ProVeX: Signature Generation



ProVeX: Signature Generation

► Prerequisites

- Decrypt recorded C&C traffic with known crypto material
- Identify message type field within C&C protocol

	offset	0	1	2	3	...	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55
Update	packet A	6a	07	34	05	...	02	16	00	50	05	68	a9	d7	3a			
	packet B	15	a9	36	05	...	01	66	00	50	05	9b	c0	9c	a6	16	07	
	packet C	8d	26	37	05	...	01	62	00	50	05	0c	45	c3	8e	47	35	<u>ef</u>
	packet D	f9	<u>fe</u>	35	05	...	02	38	00	50	05	48	0d	3c	7d	11		
	packet E	63	e1	32	05	...	02	2e	00	50	05	3e	5c					
	packet F	96	<u>ab</u>	37	05	...	02	<u>bc</u>	00	50	05	c2	b7	65	5f	b9	22	9f
Version!	packet G	47	80	37	01	...	7a	0a	a7	9a	3d	ad	98	07	60	51	78	83
Peerlist?	packet H	<u>fa</u>	91	36	02	...	<u>fe</u>	28	d3	19	17	<u>fc</u>	81	78	76	4e	62	
Peerlist!	packet I	a9	35	37	03	...	89	5f	b1	a7	f1	c9	62	81	70	ad	1c	cc
Version!	packet J	07	f4	35	01	...	c5	0f	a7	9b	5c	70	29	92	90	08		


ProVeX: Signature Generation

offset	0	1	2	3	...	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55
packet A	6a	07	34	05	...	02	16	00	50	05	68	a9	d7	3a			
packet B	15	a9	36	05	...	01	66	00	50	05	9b	c0	9c	a6	16	07	
packet C	8d	26	37	05	...	01	62	00	50	05	0c	45	c3	8e	47	35	<u>ef</u>
packet D	f9	<u>fe</u>	35	05	...	02	38	00	50	05	48	0d	3c	7d	11		
packet E	63	e1	32	05	...	02	2e	00	50	05	3e	5c					
packet F	96	<u>ab</u>	37	05	...	02	<u>bc</u>	00	50	05	c2	b7	65	5f	b9	22	9f

$$psig = \langle \underbrace{((o_1, b_1, p_1), \dots, (o_n, b_n, p_n))}_{\text{Payload bytes}}, \underbrace{(o_t, b_t)}_{\text{Msg type}}, \underbrace{(o_{pl}, l_{pl}, e_{pl})}_{\text{Payload len}} \rangle$$

- ▶ $((44, 0x01, 50\%), (44, 0x02, 50\%), (46, 0x00, 100\%), (47, 0x50, 100\%), (48, 0x05, 100\%),$
 $)$

ProVeX: Signature Matching



- ▶ Signature matches if $S \geq 4.0$ and $R \geq 75\%$

Evaluation

True Positive Evaluation

- ▶ Cross folds to test for generality of signatures
- ▶ Cross environments – learn at A, apply at B

Family	# sigs	CV TPR
Cutwail	1	100%
Fynloski	11	78%
Palevo	5	87%
Pramro	1	81.5%
Ramnit	5	97%
Sality	2	100%
Tofsee	1	100%
Virut	1	100%
ZeroAccess	3	100%
Zeus P2P	5	100%

False Positive Evaluation

► Probabilistic:

<i>family</i>	$S = 4, R = 0.5$ P_{fam} matches	$S = 4, R = 0.75$ P_{fam} matches	$S = 4, R = 0.9$ P_{fam} matches
Cutwail	$2^{-34.5}$ 6118	$2^{-52.6}$ 1118	$2^{-67.7}$ 43
Fynloski	$2^{-36.6}$ 6518	$2^{-45.4}$ 1426	$2^{-54.4}$ 69
Palevo	$2^{-39.4}$ 900	$2^{-47.0}$ 186	$2^{-47.0}$ 7
Pramro	$2^{-40.0}$ 1	$2^{-40.0}$ 1	$2^{-40.0}$ 1
Ramnit	$2^{-34.4}$ 3556	$2^{-43.8}$ 649	$2^{-54.4}$ 40
Sality	$2^{-39.9}$ 638	$2^{-53.1}$ 139	$2^{-69.2}$ 10
Tofsee	$2^{-41.0}$ 512	$2^{-64.5}$ 56	$2^{-80.0}$ 1
Virut	$2^{-41.0}$ 256	$2^{-58.8}$ 46	$2^{-80.0}$ 1
ZeroAccess	$2^{-39.4}$ 768	$2^{-57.2}$ 138	$2^{-78.4}$ 3
Zeus P2P	$2^{-38.4}$ 1536	$2^{-56.2}$ 276	$2^{-72.0}$ 7

- Live network: 3 FPs for Palevo in 24h
- Packet fuzzing: 123 FPs for Virut in 2^{35} random packets

Qualitative Evaluation

- ▶ What do the signatures cover?
 - ▶ *Zeus*: IP version type field in peer lists
 - ▶ *ZeroAccess*: Age attribute in peer lists
 - ▶ *Cutwail*: Message length and `addr` payload substring
 - ▶ *Sality*: Padding of NULL-bytes
 - ▶ ...

- ▶ Efficiency
 - ▶ With 50 families: 418MBit/s (not optimized, single core)
 - ▶ Straightforward to parallelize!

Conclusion

- ▶ Payload detection fails for crypted C&C channels
- ▶ ProVeX can detect even encrypted C&C traffic
 - ▶ Semi-automatically learn probabilistic vectorized sigs
 - ▶ Apply sigs on decrypted network traffic
- ▶ Evaluation promising

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